Note: From A Theology of Authority (Baker, 2025). Reprinted by permission of the publisher. Citations have been omitted.
The first task of this book is to clarify what we mean by authority. If a pastor does have authority, is this different from a parent’s authority over a child? A police officer’s over a citizen? An employer’s over an employee? Unfortunately, we use one word, “authority,” but it can have more or less weight and can be legitimate or illegitimate. Our language matters: “Frequently language is both a symbol of authority and the most effective way by which it is maintained.” [Richard De George, The Nature and Limits of Authority, p. 103] Further, we tend to have many assumptions about how leadership, power, submission and authority are all related, and these concepts need to be better articulated. For instance, we often hear the word “submission” and assume that the person being submitted to is in authority over the one submitting. But this is too hasty a conclusion.
Ephesians 5:21 is a case in point. At the end of a list of effects of being “filled by the Spirit” (v. 18) is the statement that these Ephesian believers should be “submitting yourselves to one another in fear of Christ.” This does not then mean that everyone has authority over everyone else. Instead, this connotes a posture of humility toward one another and a consideration of others, with each caring for both their own interests and the interests of others (see also Philippians 2:3-4, which associates humility and others-care). Similarly, we read I Timothy 2:12, “I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over a man,” and we then assume what is not there – that men are allowed to have authority over women. Such a positive statement about men’s authority is nowhere to be found in the New Testament, and yet we assume it. Add to this that the word used for “authority” (authenteō) in this context is not the same as the word Paul typically uses for “authority” (exousia) in his other letters. Further, Paul seems to wield an apostolic authority that is distinct from what a pastor would have today, and even then, he does so sparingly. These distinctions in words and contexts illustrate my point: There are different kinds of authority at play in the New Testament. We will return to the interpersonal dynamics of authority within the body of Christ in chapter 9, but these two snapshots help to initially expose some of our common assumptions.
To bring our assumptions more clearly in focus, turning to present-day engagement with the ideas of power and authority will help us to have a lens for engaging scripture. While Paul and other New Testament writers do not use the categories that later thinkers have constructed, I do believe that these categories are still helpful in capturing what the Christian scriptures are describing. For now, we will begin with current discussions of these terms before turning to the biblical material, though I will mention some of what I believe is going on with authority and power even in these brick-forming chapters.
Analyzing Authority: Executive Authority
Let us now turn to analytic philosopher Richard De George, and especially his work The Nature and Limits of Authority. De George’s analysis of authority provides a helpful starting point to forming our bricks because he is not committed to those bricks being used in a certain way. The theologians we will turn to after De George do have a structure in mind, one that is guided by scripture, their cultural context and their traditions. Of course, we can still question De George’s brick formation, and will do so when appropriate, but his categories provide the conceptual building blocks, the clay for the bricks, as we move forward.
We begin with how authority is understood more generally, as well as how it relates to power and rights. In the case of “authority,” De George proposes that we often mean “the right or power to act for or on someone else.” [Richard De George, The Nature and Limits of Authority, p. 22] This is what De George calls “executive authority.” We might think of a queen’s right to command a subject. This is especially important because we often bring categories of executive authority into our interpersonal relationships in the church when these are not appropriate. Such a tendency makes sense, however, as most of what is written about authority deals with the executive kind. In contrast, a person can be an authority – for example, by knowing more about a specific topic than others know – but this does not warrant their having authority or power over others. For instance, knowing more about theology than another person might make you an authority without your having authority over someone. De George calls this “nonexecutive authority” (which we will look at in the next chapter). Yet power is present in both executive and nonexecutive authorities, which is why we also need a working definition of “power” in order to understand authority. I will focus on power as being able to do something but not necessarily having a right to do it. For instance, I might have the power (such as a learned ability) to drive a car but may not have the right if my license was revoked for speeding. This is an important definition because of how power and authority are related to each other, and it stands in slight contrast to the common definition of “authority” as “power legitimately exercised.” [Jonathan Leeman, Political Church, p. 61] The main reason for maintaining this contrast is that different kinds of authority can be legitimately or illegitimately exercised and yet still be powerful. For instance, a police officer can threaten someone wielding a gun, telling them to drop it or the officer will fire. The person holding the gun may not want to drop the gun but is forced to do so against their will. This can be legitimate if the person is holding the gun and breaking the law; however, this can also be illegitimate if the person is perceived to be holding a gun but is not or is holding a gun and not doing anything illegal in the process. In either case, the police officer has authority and the power to enact a consequence.
There are also different kinds of power that are in play across the different forms of authority (both executive and nonexecutive). The right to use these different forms of power and whether that includes power over others are especially our focus. For instance, in the example of driving just given, the person with the power to drive and the right to drive does not necessarily have authority over others, even if they can affect others by how they drive. As we will see, having “power to” does not mean having “power over,” but someone can have power over and use that to give power to others. The language of “right” is thus more about what I am allowed to do as an individual and often does not need to involve other persons. So, right and power can have overlap, but they are not the same.
Executive Imperative Authority
De George calls executive authority – be it the authority of the state, of an organization or of a parent – an executive imperative authority, in which the authority figure has “the right or the power…to command someone who is subject to authority…to act or to forbear from acting in certain ways.”[Richard De George, The Nature and Limits of Authority, p. 63] We can think of this even more mundanely: take my executive authority as a lecturer. I have the power to command obedience, such as “submit this assessment by this date,” and to enforce consequences if that due date is missed. The source of my authority is my institution, as they have authorized me to teach and hold the position of lecturer with the responsibilities of lecturing and grading.
Thus, the prevalence of discussion and literature about executive authority makes sense. This is a pervasive and necessary form of authority both in the human family and in society. The best, and most common, microcosm of executive authority is the parent-child relationship. The health, safety and development of the child require this executive form of authority. For example, if left to their own devices, my children would never eat vegetables. However, I exercise my parental executive authority over them by means of their not getting to eat dessert or not getting after-dinner screen time if they do not eat their vegetables. Granted, I cannot force my children to eat, but I can enforce consequences should they choose not to do this. Ideally, the response to authority is obedience. Zooming out to the level of government, the state holds an executive authority over its citizens. There are laws that must be obeyed, or the state can enforce consequences. That enforcement typically comes through the delegation of executive authority as seen in law enforcement writing citations or warnings, placing someone in restraints or taking them to jail. Thus, generally “an executive authority has the right or power to act for or on someone else. A nonexecutive authority does not.” [Richard De George, The Nature and Limits of Authority, p. 22] One feature of executive authority is that it is needed regardless of context. To illustrate, we can return to the example of parent-child executive authority: So long as a child is a child, this authority is needed, though it will not (or, ideally, should not) be needed when the child matures into adulthood. Such an authority can also be delegated, as when police officers are authorized to act on behalf of the judicial branch of the United States government.
Executive Performative Authority
De George considers all other forms of executive authority to be performative (he calls it “performatory,” but I will use “performative” to keep it parallel to “imperative”). By that he means “the right or power…to perform some action, something on or for another person.” [Richard De George, The Nature and Limits of Authority, p. 63] He gives examples of a surgeon operating on a patient, a treasurer paying bills on behalf of an organization, or a justice of the peace declaring a couple legally married. This kind of authority can be positional because of the role or office a person holds for an organization. However, it can also be more personal, such as when a client authorizes another person, a lawyer, to act on their behalf. For performative authority, the power differential is not necessarily as pronounced as what we have seen with parent-child, government-citizen and employer-employee relations. In the examples of surgeons and lawyers, these are hired roles of those who are performing the task paid for by a patient or client. We could even say that the patient and client have more power than the surgeon or lawyer, since the patient’s or client’s payment authorizes that performative authority to be enacted. Yet once this authority has been granted, the surgeon will have more power when the patient is under anesthesia, and the lawyer will have more power in the courtroom when they step up to give an opening statement on behalf of the client. Power differentials are quite dynamic. In light of this, while the ideal response to executive imperative authority is obedience (and assumed consent), these examples make that response a bit awkward in the case of executive performative authority. While De George does not parse out differences between responses to imperative authority and responses to performative authority, I would describe the ideal response to performative authority as cooperation (and assumed consent). Also, instead of an imposed consequence, performative authority deals more with natural consequences (e.g., lack of medical treatment, lack of legal representation).
Further, a person could have both imperative and performative authority. For instance, a parent can have performative authority as they change a child’s diaper, drive the child to school or buy the clothing the child will wear. The state might exercise performative authority by appointing legal representation to act on behalf of someone charged with a crime, while also having imperative authority to detain the person charged. Both executive imperative and executive performative authority are significant expressions of authority. What I want to question throughout this book is whether such authority is theologically justified in present-day Christian communities and, if so, what the nature and limits of such authority are.
Taken from A Theology of Authority: Rethinking Leadership in the Church, by Christa L. McKirkland, ISBN: 9781540968166; used with permission from Baker Publishing 6030 East Fulton Road Ada, MI 49301.
Christa L. McKirkland, dean of faculty and lecturer in systematic theology, Carey Baptist College
